Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 34
Issue 4 October 2001

Article 5

10-2001

The Role of Lawyers in the World Trade Organization
Peter D. Ehrenhaft

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Peter D. Ehrenhaft, The Role of Lawyers in the World Trade Organization, 34 Vanderbilt Law Review 963
(2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol34/iss4/5

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

COMMENTS
The Role of Lawyers in the World
Trade Organization
PeterD. Ehrenhaft*
The World Trade Organization is a marvelously ambitious effort
of now 140 countries to bring the rule of law to international trade.
The WTO is a logical extension of the inspired ideas of the draftsmen
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), who
recognized at the end of World War II that the seeds of that
conflagration were sown, in part, by the chaotic condition of
international trade following World War I.
During that inter-war period, the United States adopted its
Antidumping Act of 1921 and its Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.
Both survive to this day.
By 1934, however, the Roosevelt
Administration proposed reciprocal trade agreements intended to
soften the impact of the barriers to our markets those laws created.
The GATT was a logical extension of that concept, essentially
enshrining as the two keystones of freer trade "national treatment"
and "most-favored nation" commitments. Indeed, the GATT is
sometimes characterized as two paragraphs-with two thousand
pages of exceptions. The WTO Agreements now cover twenty-seven
thousand pages.
From the beginning, the GATT addressed the settlement of
disputes between trading nations. Disputes were recognized as
inevitable.
The GATT dispute resolution procedure was part
mediation and part arbitration. It depended on the good offices of
experienced representatives of unaffected members to help the
disputing parties find common ground to settle their differences.
Increasingly, however, particularly representatives of the United
States sought a more rigorous procedure leading to a judgment that
one party was right and the other one was wrong-and the latter had
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either to correct its ways or provide compensation to the aggrieved
complainant.
Increased American attachment to this rule of law model
through the 1980s prompted U.S. negotiators of the WTO agreements
to seek a greatly strengthened Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). This
Body maintained the previous system of panels to hear-and settletrade disputes. In addition, an Appellate Body was to be created with
semi-permanent judges to review the legal issues raised in panel
reports. Moreover, and critically, the judgment of a panel was to be
implemented by the affected parties unless a consensus of all the
WTO's members decided it need not be adopted.
Paradoxically, although these results of the WTO negotiations
appeared to be a triumph of the rule of law, the United States, in
particular, was quite diffident about the notion that private lawyers
should have a role in the system. The concern of the United States
about including private lawyers as participants in the dispute
resolution procedures of the WTO sprang from a number of factors.
They included, first, a fear that such lawyers might be excessively
aggressive and unable or unwilling to recognize the possible
advantages of compromise and only partial victory. Concern was also
expressed about such lawyers' possible conflicts of interest and their
inability to keep confidential the information to which they might be
given access in the course of such proceedings. In negotiating the
NAFTA before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round creating the
WTO, both Canadian and U.S. negotiators were reluctant to give
private counsel the right to appear on behalf of specific industries or
economic interests in their countries before NAFTA dispute
settlement bodies-other than under Chapter 19 that created special
panels in lieu of court review of antidumping and countervailing duty
orders. Neither government wanted the lawyers for U.S. Steel to
argue independently for their client's views in other NAFTA-or,
later, WTO-fora, lest it lessen the governments' ultimate control of
their trade policy.
This perspective, arguably proper in the NAFTA context, lacked
an appreciation of the problem of many members of the WTO. Small
and often new states in the organization rarely employ experienced
WTO specialists in their governments. They often lack any lawyers
versed in WTO procedures, able to represent their positions in WTO
dispute settlement proceedings. If their rights are to be protected or
vindicated, they need access to advocates, likely to come from the
private bars of the U.S. or U.K. Eventually, the Appellate Body
agreed and the practice appears to have evolved to the point that
private counsel employed by a government participant can now
appear in both appellate and panel proceedings on behalf of a
government. From that narrow prospective, the private bar has won
its battle for access.
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Attached as Appendix A is a document from the American Bar
It includes the recommendation of its Section of
Association.
International Law and Practice, adopted by the Association's House
of Delegates in 1998, urging the WTO to take formal action to permit
private counsel to appear in dispute settlement procedures. The
recommendation was accompanied by a report that provides a
historical perspective of the issue and attaches a proposed "Code of
Conduct" that the Committee preparing the report thought would be
useful to address some of the concerns of the U.S. government with
regard to this development. The Author chaired the Committee that
prepared this report.
Private counsel do now appear in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings, but no "Code of Conduct" has been adopted. Perhaps it
is unnecessary. Nevertheless, it provides an interesting focus for
further discussion.
Quite apart from the narrow question of counsel in dispute
settlement proceedings is the far larger question of the role of lawyers
and "hard law" in a body such as the World Trade Organization. Is
the WTO the type of organization that can and should be viewed as
bound by the law existing at its creation, as expressed in the
agreement signed at the time and then ratified by the members? Or
is it capable of making new laws that are not subject to unanimous
consent or ratification? If it has a rule making function, is it
accountable to its members in terms of such values as democracy and
transparency?
These are the much more interesting and pervasive problems
than the simple issue of private lawyer participation in WTO dispute
resolution proceedings. They impact our vision of the proper role of
the WTO in a fast-changing world of diverse states that are at
different stages of development and with often competing values.
Lawyers, particularly those trained in the United States, are
concerned about accountability and transparency in the law. The
citizens of other countries may mock the extent to which U.S. lawyers
take to court issues that they would never present for adjudication.
They decry the volume of our litigation. At the same time, few, if any,
other countries have developed our keen appreciation for the need for
imposing accountability by all who can exercise control over others.
Be they presidents or teachers, CEOs or shop stewards, or even
parents and social workers, everyone must be ready to explain their
behavior to a judge and abide by core principles in exercising their
Some of our ideas, such as class actions, punitive
authority.
damages, and freedom of information, to cite but three relatively
unique elements of the U.S. legal system, are instrumental in
achieving that accountability. It is a necessary part of our concept of
legitimate government.
Can we fit the WTO into that model? Its members designate
representatives pursuant to their constitutional government
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organization. But they may also delegate to the WTO decisionmaking and law-creating rights and obligations that are beyond
practical accountability. Is the United States prepared to cede some
elements of its sovereignty to such an organization? If so, must it
assure access to the organization's decision-making bodies by
ordinary citizens and non-governmental organizations? The civil
society representatives claim that their access is necessary to render
the Organization's decisions legitimate. But most NGOs are selfselected, self-funded and often no more representative of democratic
values than any industry, company, labor union, or other interest
group.
Moreover, the unequal funding of NGOs and their
concentration in but a few countries provides an added base for
questioning their claims that their participation is indispensable to
legitimate rule making.
It is in this area of legitimization of the WTO in which our
concerns about the rule of law should be most pointed. Hopefully the
commentaries and presentations at this symposium will help us to
focus on these transcendent issues.
Obviously this issue is much larger and deserving of much more
time than my brief comments permit. But I will venture a few points.
First, lawyers could be welcomed at all levels of the DSB. As this
has been achieved, there is not much more that need be said other
than that a Code of Conduct may be a useful adjunct to this practice.
Second, it is not the proper role of the Secretariat to provide
counsel to members involved in dispute settlement procedures. As a
way to obtain advice "on the cheap," some of the less developed
countries have relied on advice given by current or former GATT
officials or lawyers who are also paid by the organization. This type
of legal aid to governments by the body that is deciding cases is
inappropriate and inadequate. A separate body-external to the
WTO and funded outside the WTO budget-could usefully provide
expert legal services to countries lacking human and monetary
resources independently to pursue their rights and obligations.
Moreover, I do not doubt that highly expert lawyers in a number of
countries-including the United States-would be willing to appear
on a pro bono or reduced fee basis in the WTO for states that cannot
afford U.S. billing rates. But observing the entertainment budgets of
many missions to Geneva also makes me skeptical of the claims that
funds are lacking to retain counsel for disputes important enough to
pursue.
Third, U.S. requests for transparency in dispute settlement
procedures, no less than in other rulemaking functions of the WTO,
are proper and should be pressed. DSB procedures could partake of
mediation or arbitration in which confidential communication is often
essential to achieving a successful outcome. In fact, however, most
panel procedures begin only after negotiation and mediation have
failed. They become adjudicatory procedures in which the positions of
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the parties ought to be available and decisions made public as soon as
they are released to the parties. Similarly, formal proposals to the
other organs of the WTO ought to be available to all when filed. Such
procedures do not prevent private negotiations; they do not compel
the advance disclosure of all negotiating positions. But they allow the
public to know what issues are on the table. That, alone, helps
assure both accountability and opportunity for comment.
Fourth, unlimited access by NGOs to DSB procedures or other
WTO functions is not necessary or desirable.
NGOs may have
knowledge and views that may be useful for decision-makers. The
right of NGOs to file briefs and to request invitations to appear ought
to regularized. But, as the Appellate Body has done, while accepting
amicus briefs, the tribunal need not accord the briefs any weight nor
discuss their contentions in decisions. As noted, NGOSs are too selfdirected and unequally funded to be accorded greater appearance
rights. Their funding sources and "real parties at interest" are often
undisclosed. On the other hand, a rigorous policy of exclusion will
deny the WTO tribunals useful and unique information possibly not
otherwise available, and may undermine public confidence in the
institutions of the WTO and their decisions.
Fifth, periodic oversight review of WTO participation should be
encouraged in all member states. Democratic values require periodic
opportunities for the public to review the results of their governing
institutions.
Governments conduct periodic elections for that
purpose. The WTO- and most other international organizationsprovide no such reviews by other than the governments who are
represented within their membership. But this is a relatively closed
group. Some form of a review in which citizens and NGOs are
assured an opportunity to comment and to see and hear the decisionmakers is desirable if the rulemaking functions of the organization
continue to expand.

Appendix A

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION*
SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
RECOMMENDATION
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association:
1. Supports the further development of the dispute settlement
procedures in international trade matters created under the Uruguay
Round Agreements establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO);
2. Endorses procedures to assure all parties the right to be
represented by counsel of their selection, including non-government
personnel duly accredited by the government using such assistance,
in all phases of the dispute settlement process from the request for
consultation to the implementation of panel and WTO Appellate Body
decisions, including the gathering of relevant facts, the preparation of
written submissions to panels and the WTO Appellate Body,
attendance at hearings, the presentation of oral argument to those
presiding over the proceedings and participation in settlement
negotiations; and
3. Urges that, in the context of the scheduled 1998 review of the
WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the United States
supports appropriate policies, rules and procedures to enable any
party in a dispute subject to the DSU to seek, employ and use counsel
of such party's selection for participation on behalf of such party at all
phases of the proceedings.

* Reprinted by Permission.
Copyright 1998 American Bar Association,
Recommendation and Report No. 118A, "Private Counsel in IVTO Dispute Settlement
Procedures"approvedby the ABA House of Delegates, February 1998.
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REPORT
Private Counsel in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings
Overview
Through this Recommendation, the American Bar Association
(ABA) expresses support for the right of Member countries of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) to retain legal counsel of their
choice to represent their interests in all phases of WTO disputes
settlement procedures.
The dispute settlement process of the WTO is one the United
States has long championed. It is critical to a viable rule-oriented
international trading system. The ability of all countries to obtain
competent legal advice bears directly on the credibility and
effectiveness of the system.
This Recommendation builds upon and is fully consistent with
the resolution adopted by the ABA at its Annual Meeting in 1993
supporting the creation of the WTO and its strengthened multilateral
dispute resolution procedures.
I.

Background

The Agreements creating the World Trade Organization (WTO),
most of which entered into force in 1995, included an important
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, commonly referred to as the "Dispute Settlement
Understanding" (DSU). The DSU was actively supported by the
United States. In his Statement of Administrative Action (SAA)
sending the WTO Agreements to the Congress for implementation,
the President stated:
"The [DSU] responds to long-held U.S. concerns regarding international
trade disputes. As the country that has used the GATT dispute
settlement mechanism more than any other country, the United States
has a strong interest in having an effective process to enforce U.S.
rights under the Uruguay Round agreement" 1

Inherent in the DSU is the recognition by the WTO Members
that the GATT 1994 and other Uruguay Round Agreements contain
an expanded set of legal rights and obligations among all member
countries for the conduct of international trade. As such, the DSU is
an indispensable element of the effort to promote the rule of law
among nations. As discussed below, the GATT 1994 and other

1.
Message of the President Transmitting the Uruguay Round Agreements, H.
Doc. 103-3 16, Vol. 1, at 1008, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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Uruguay Round Agreements, to the extent they represent a move to a
more rule-oriented trading system, raise an important question
regarding the use by nations of private counsel in proceedings in
which one or more sovereign countries seek to enforce their legal
2
rights and obligations.
From an historical perspective, access to private counsel for
purposes of resolving trade disputes under the pre-Uruguay Round
regime was less of an issue, given the nature of the dispute resolution
process. However, the current structure of the GATT and CVTO
depend upon a more formal dispute resolution system. The need to
maintain the integrity of the dispute resolution process as a critical
element of this structure, and the right of sovereign countries to
defend their rights in this new structure, argue against restrictions
on access to and use of legal experts of any nation's choice.
A. The Historical Context
The draft charter for an International Trade Organization
drafted immediately after World War II (but which never came into
effect) included a major chapter on dispute settlement, with some
recourse to the International Court of Justice (after completing
elaborate ITO procedures). The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, (GATT), prepared at the same time, included only sketchy
provisions on dispute settlement. The original intent of the
negotiators in 1947 and 1948 was that the ITO would be the
institution, and the GATT merely a treaty of tariff concessions to be
implemented under the ITO umbrella.
The GATT includes brief references to disputes (Articles XXII
and XXIII) but they focus on the concept of "nullification or
impairment," rather than strict breach of treaty obligations. Even
though the language empowered the GATT Contracting Parties to
make "rulings," diplomatic habits of many participants led some to
argue that the GATT dispute resolution procedures were not to be too
"legalistic" or "juridical," but rather were designed only to facilitate
negotiation of settlements.
Over the years. GATT practice began to cause dispute settlement
procedures to focus more precisely on treaty obligations and their
interpretation. In the late 1950's, the GATT shifted from the context
of "working parties" (with government representatives), to "panels"
consisting of several independent experts not acting as government
representatives. In 1962, a major case brought by Uruguay against
many industrial country trade practices caused a panel to create the

2.
The term "private counsel" is used broadly to include any attorney or legal
adviser who is not a full-time or permanent employee of the government of a member
nation.
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concept of "prima facie nullification or impairment" whenever a
breach of obligations could be established. This would shift the
burden to the defending country to show the absence of nullification
or impairment. The essential effect of these developments was to
make the process much more focused on the law and its application.
This practice was affirmed and embodied in an "Understanding"
adopted by the GATT at the end of the Tokyo Round negotiations in
1979.
These trends continued as many more cases were brought and
reports took on more of a legal flavor. In the 1980's, a legal division
was created in the GATT and the practice developed of assigning a
lawyer of the GATT Secretariat to work with each panel, so that by
the late 1980's the panel reports were much more rigorously worded
(and much longer). Proceedings became more like administrative
hearings, with published findings and recommended corrective action
rather than efforts to reach a compromise settlement. Increasing the
dispute settlement function developed into a more rule-oriented
system declaring parties' rights and obligations. It was in fact
admiration of these developments that partly led various trade
interests to urge the GATT to embrace new subjects, such as services
and intellectual property, In addition, other bilateral or regional
treaties established dispute settlement procedures which emulated
the GATT practice as it evolved.
B. The Present Perspective
With the Uruguay Round Agreements, panels are expected to
deal with a greatly enlarged set of issues, reflecting the expansion of
WTO membership and the inclusion under WTO auspices of
agreements
affecting
services
(professional,
tourism
and
telecommunications), intellectual property rights and foreign direct
investment. In fact, the use of the panels has exceeded expectations
to date. As of October 1997 cases numbered more than 100 (in less
than three years). See Exhibit 1. The DSU seems to push the dispute
process further towards an "adjudication model" although there are
still references in the DSU that suggest the importance of the earlier
idea of assisting settlements. For example, the DSU provides:
"3.2
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central
element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral
trading system. The Members of the [WTOI recognize that it serves to
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered
agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law....

However other clauses may be seen to refer back to notions of
conciliation and negotiated settlement. For example:
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"3.4
Recommendations or rulings made by [panels) shall be
aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter in
accordance with the rights and obligations under this Understanding
and under the covered agreements."

But further language can be read as confirming the "rule
orientation" rather than negotiation emphasis, even with a view that
satisfactory settlements are important. For example:
"3.5
All solutions to matters formally raised under the
consultation and dispute settlement rules and procedures of the covered
agreements, including arbitration awards, shall be consistent with
those agreements and shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to
any Member under those agreements, nor impede the attainment of
any objective of those agreements.
"3.6
Mutually agreed solutions to matters formally raised under
the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered
agreements shall be notified to the [WTO] and the relevant councils
and committees, where any Member may raise any point relating
thereto."

Practice regarding procedures under the DSU is still evolving,
influenced by the experience under GATT as modified by the new
treaty language, including the requirement that the newly created
Appellate Body expressly review the legal issues raised before the
panel whose report is being appealed. At this time:
- Panelists are selected from many countries and often are not lavyers,
much less lawyers with a background in serving as judges.
- Governments appear before panels to defend government interests
under international agreements and to protect their sovereignty. Of
course, these interests can - and often do - coincide with interests of
private parties in their own countries.
- Governments claim a greater interest in preserving 'the system" than
prevailing in a particular matter.
Submissions to panels by governments are regarded by some
governments to be confidential diplomatic exchanges, although the
rules allow governments to make their own submittals public within
certain constraints.
-

GATT and WTO practice has not been uniform regarding the use
by governments of private counsel of their selection outside the panel
hearings. No DSU language addresses this question, and general
international practice (discussed below) quite clearly leaves such
decision to the government concerned. The GATT 1995 Analytical
Index on Article XXIII dispute settlement cases has nothing reported
on this question. It has been reported that when a government
objected, private counsel were not permitted in the hearing rooms of
the panels, although private counsel did attend in cases in which no
objection was voiced and often worked with governments outside the
hearing room in the preparation of cases and written submissions.
Both prior to and since the creation of the WTO, it has been the
United States government that has most often voiced the view that
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private counsel should be excluded from hearings, although other
governments have also taken that position.
In the GATT era, the exclusion of private counsel was not based
on a conscious decision of the Contracting Parties. Rather, it was
based of a view that panels were essentially diplomatic conferences
between government representatives
designed to
resolve
intergovernmental dispute. Nevertheless, private counsel were not
infrequently "in the corridors." Affected private interests sought to
press their views on government representatives and governments
saw their interests as similar (if not identical) to such private
interests, and benefited from the factual and legal expertise of
lawyers representing private parties. Governments often welcomed or
retained counsel sewing on bases ranging from fully paid to limited
honoraria to pro bono, in writing submissions, gathering evidence and
preparing government spokespersons who actually "appeared."
In the recent WTO panel proceeding regarding claims by several
countries, including the United States, that EC regulations
concerning banana imports violated the GATT, an objection was
raised to the presence in the proceeding of private counsel utilized by
a smaller country which did not have access to in-house governmental
expertise on WTO dispute proceedings and its private attorneys was
excluded. The panel stated in its report:
"It has been past practice in GA'T and WTO dispute settlement
proceedings not to admit private lawyers to panel meetings if any party
objected to their presence and in this case the Complainants did so
object.
"In the working procedures of the Panel, which were adopted at the
Panel's organizational meeting, we had expressed our expectation that
only members of governments would be present at panel meetings.
"The presence of private lawyers in delegations of some third parties
would be unfair to those parties and other third parties who had
utilized the services of private lawyers in preparing their submissions,
but who were not accompanied by those lawyers because they assumed
that all participants at the meeting would comply with our expectations
as expressed in the working procedures adopted by the Panel at its
organizational meeting.
"Given that private lawyers may not be subject to disciplinary rules
such as those that applied to members of governments, their presence
in Panel meetings could give rise to concerns about breaches of
confidentiality. "There was a question in our minds whether the
admission of private lawyers to Panel meetings, if it became common
practice, would be in the interest of smaller Members as it could entail
disproportionately large financial burdens for them.
"Moreover, we had concerns about whether the presence of private
lawyers would change the intergovernmental character of the VTO
dispute settlement proceedings.
"We noted that our request would not in any respect adversely affect
the right of parties or third parties to meet and consult with their
private lawyers in the course of panel proceedings, nor to receive legal
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or other advice in the preparation of written submissions from nongovernmental experts."

Panel Report (US) at 275-276.
Certain questions may be raised about the accuracy of this panel
report and whether, even if accurate, this limited practice can be
considered influential under general principles of international law.
More importantly, the Bananas panel refers to a special agreement
for the procedures in that - case which may control it. The Panel
Report was then appealed to the Appellate Body and the issue was
again raised. The WTO Appellate Body did not review the issue of
counsel before the Panel because that issue was not appealed.
However, when the Complaining Parties, including the United States,
objected to the presence of private counsel for other parties before the
Appellate Body as well, the Appellate Body rejected the objection,
noting that if found "nothing in the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (the "WTO Agreement"),
the DSU or the Working Procedures, nor in customary international
law or the prevailing practice of international tribunals, which
prevents a WTO Member from determining the composition of its
delegation in Appellate Body proceedings." Having considered the full
panoply of concerns with private counsel participation in WTO
dispute resolution proceedings, as articulated by the U.S. and other
governments the Appellate Body ruled that "it is for a WTO Member
to decide who should represent it as members of its delegation in an
oral hearing of the Appellate Body."3
While the Appellate Body specifically noted that the issue of
private counsel participation in the underlying panel process was not
formally appealed, and that its decision was limited to participation
in the Appellate Body hearing, a number of observations regarding
access to private counsel appear to be applicable across the board to
any form of dispute proceeding within the WTO context. For example,
the Appellate Body specifically remarked that "it is well-known that
in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, many governments seek and
obtain extensive assistance from private counsel, who are not
employees of the governments concerned, in advising on legal issues;
preparing written submissions to panels as well as to the Appellate
Body; preparing written responses to questions from panels and from
other parties as well as from the Appellate Body; and other
preparatory work relating to panel and Appellate Body proceedings."
Despite this recent ruling of the Appellate Body, no rules or
guidelines have been adopted by the WTO regarding the ways in

3.

European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution

of Bananas, WT/DS27/,G3R at 5 (Sep.9, 1997).
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which countries may work with or retain outside counsel. No
information is available at the WTO as to whether a government has
retained or is working with outside counsel, whom counsel actually
represents, what, if any, conflict-of-interests check has been made by
the government, what confidentiality obligations a Member country
has imposed on outside counsel or who is paying for the counsel
retained. At the same time, we note that other international agencies
and fora also impose no such requirements for submitting
information
about
persons
representing
the
participating
governments. The WTO has not decided whether outside counsel may
be properly "accredited" by a country as a member of that country's
delegation to the WTO for a DSB proceeding. The WTO Secretariat
only determines whether an individual has been named to a
Member's delegation, allowing any delegation to decide for itself who
may serve that Contracting Party. No other WTO standard exists for
reviewing the credentials or qualifications of delegates.
The GATT, and now the WTO, does provide assistance to
developing and least developed country members who request such
assistance. See Procedures Under Article XXIII, Decision of April,
1966 ["1966 Decision"]. This involves both ability to request the good
offices of the Director-General "with a view to facilitating a solution"
[1966 Decision, para. 11, the provision of technical assistance from the
WTO Secretariat to developing countries involved in a dispute [DSU
Art. 27.21, the conduct of "special training courses for interested
Members concerning these dispute settlement procedures and
practices so as to enable Members' experts to be better informed in
this regard" [DSU Art. 27.21, and special procedures for leastdeveloped country members including a requirement of "due
restraint" by other countries in challenging conduct of such countries
[DSU Art. 24.1]. The "qualified legal expert from the WTO technical
cooperation services" provided to developing countries upon request
pursuant to DSU Art. 27.2 have often been individuals with long
experience in GATT and now WTO matters. Thus, developing
countries, regardless of financial resources, have access to legal
experts on WTO issues if involved in a dispute. However, such
experts do not appear at panel hearings as counsel to participating
governments.
II.

The Issues Now

There appears to be no solid legal basis for a rule under GATT or
the WTO to limit a sovereign nation's right to choose for itself what
representation it will utilize in the proceedings of the organization.
Even if there were some element of constraint under GATT, it can be
argued that the WTO, as a new organization, with new treaty
language, could find reason to depart from such constraint.
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A number of interests support the right of governments to decide
their representation including the use of private counsel, unless or
until there is concrete treaty or treaty-based decisional language to
the contrary:
- Fundamental concepts of due process suggest that parties to a
dispute should be permitted to seek the assistance of advisers and
advocates.
-- Governments without the internal resources to defend their
interests, either as respondents in proceedings or complainants, may
need private counsel from their own or other countries, to serve as
their advisors and spokespersons to enable them to participate in the
DSB in a meaningful way.
- Governments may wish to have private counsel serve as their
representatives, because those governments may view their national
interest in a dispute identical to the interests otherwise represented
by private counsel.
The principal objections to use of private counsel appear to be:
- A fear that private lawyers may introduce an adversarial,
excessively litigious style of representation that is alien to the system
and would undermine its effectiveness to assist in the settlement of
disputes.
-- Private lawyers would be subject to no effective discipline for
misconduct or breach of obligations of confidentiality or conflicts of
interest. There is no "WTO bar," and the lawyers' home bars may be
either unable or unwilling to exercise effective discipline.
- Private lawyers, retained on a case-by-case basis, may not
convey the perspective of governments that have a commitment to an
enduring set of rules and institutions under the WTO.
- Participation of private counsel complicates issues of
confidentiality -- both as to the business confidential data produced in
a proceeding and as to the very conduct of the proceedings, such as
the settlement postures of some participating countries and the
panelists' reactions to them.
- Some countries cannot afford to retain private counsel and
would be disadvantaged by being unrepresented. Other countries lack
the internal resources to match the efforts opposing private counsel
might bring to bear for Members.
- Panelists are insufficiently experienced to deal with skilled
lawyers, particularly lawyers who may advocate different - even
opposing -- views in different cases. -- The number of lawyers
available for this work is limited, and the practice could become
excessively concentrated in the hands of a few U.S. and E.U. firms or
individuals.
- The use of private counsel creates risks of conflicts of interest
and other ethical concerns which the WTO is not equipped to address.
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A. General Principles of International Law
One of the general principles of public international law is that
sovereign states are free to choose who represent them before
international organizations, absent specific rules to the contrary in
the charter of the organization. The DSU contains no rules limiting
the right of a Member State of the WTO to be represented by counsel
or experts of its choice. in Bananas the WTO Appellate Body has
recognized that right in its proceedings. It has also noted that the
WTO Agreements are "not to be read in clinical isolation from public
international law." (United States - Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R at 18 (Apr. 29, 1996).
The customary international law principle of "sovereign equality
of States" includes the freedom of States to choose representation of
their choice, whether before international adjudicatory bodies or
subsidiary organs of international organizations. As stated by a
leading commentator on the International Court of Justice:
"No attempt is made in the Statute (of the ICJ] to regulate the manner
by which the parties shall be represented before the Court and this is a
matter which is largely the outcome of the practice of States in
international arbitration... The texts governing the working of the
Court are silent concerning the qualifications of counsel and advocates.
This is a domestic matter for the litigating State to settle for itself with
due regard for the status of the Court."

S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1965, at
214-16
The United Nations International Law Commission (ILC)
addressed the principle of sovereign equality during the drafting of a
Convention on the Representation of States in Their Relations with
International Organizations of a Universal Character. In that
context, the ILC Special Rapporteur explained the background to the
ILC's approach on selection of advisers on delegations:
"The Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that the sending State should
have a wider freedom of choice with respect to the members of its
delegation to organs of international organizations and to conferences
convened by such organizations [as compared with members of
permanent missions]. One of the salient features of present-day
international relations is the increasing number of subsidiary organs
set up by international organizations to deal with very specialized
matters of highly technical character which require the enlisting of the
services of experts possessing the necessary training and experience ....
For these reasons it is highly desirable, if not indispensable, that the
sending State should enjoy the widest possible freedom in the choice of
the members of its delegations to such organs and conferences."
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1970 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 11, at 19. 4
B. Practice of Other International Dispute Resolution
Tribunals
Of all major international dispute settlement tribunals, only
NAFTA limits in any way a member country's choice of counsel or the
degree of involvement by counsel in a proceeding.
1. NAFTA - Rule 25(b) of the "Model Rules of Procedure for
Chapter Twenty of the North American Free Trade Agreement,"
negotiated by the NAFTA Parties pursuant to NAFTA Article 2012: 1
and applicable to disputes other than reviews of anti-dumping and
countervailing duty proceedings, permits advisers to be present
during hearings, provided they have no financial or personal interest
in the dispute. However, the rule expressly states that they may not
address the panel. This is the only discovered instance in which the
signatories of the rules of an international dispute resolution tribunal
have chosen to limit the role of private counsel. Rule 25(b) also limits
"representatives" of the participating Governments to "employees" of
those governments (without defining that term).
The NAFTA Rules were adopted in July 1995, after the NAFTA
entered into force, and are probably not widely known. They are
curiously aimed solely at the oral presentation by "advisers" in
hearings before panels and impose a conflict-of-interest standard only
if the adviser does (or his client Party wishes the adviser to) attend
the hearing. The Rules contain no limits on Parties using "advisers"
for other purposes, such as preparing written submissions. Moreover
the conflict of interest portion of the Rule is difficult to understand. It
is written in the present tense and thus suggests that only "advisers"
with currently active "interests" in the matter before the panel are
barred. But "interests" are not defined and might be interpreted (as
some U.S. government personnel do) to be the lawyer's representation
of a different client in a different industry but with a common issue of
law that may both matters. However, as is discussed below, this is
usually not viewed as a "conflict" under local bar rules of ethics. Rule
25(b) also does not prevent a government from accepting an "adviser"
on secondment as a "special employee" (as the U.S. Government does
from time to time in other contexts), and thus evading entirely the
restrictions on "advisers."

4.
The ILC draft Convention has not been implemented because of concern of
some states (including the United States) regarding limits on their right to object 10
diplomats proposed to be assigned to permanent missions. However, no objection has

been publicly stated to the Special Rapporteur's view that 'it is highly desirable, if not
indispensable, that the sending State should enjoy the widest possible freedom in the
choice of the members of its delegations to [international] organs and conferences.'
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It is difficult to understand the rationale for this Rule, and none
has been published. Some speculate it was adopted by the U.S. and
Canadian negotiators seeking a way to protect themselves from the
requests of "advisers" representing industries in their own countries
for a right to participate in panel proceedings. By preventing all
advisers to speak, they had a "neutral principle" by which to decline
proffered "help" from domestic interests (which help might be
counterproductive to a settlement the country nevertheless sought).
However, the domestic concerns of democratic governments regarding
access by private interests in their own countries ought not to justify
a rule denying third parties -- many without internal legal resources
comparable to those available to the U.S. or Canadian governments -the right to rely on advisers in all phases of WTO proceedings.
Interestingly in Bananas, the Canadian Government supported the
request of St. Lucia to be represented by private counsel before the
Appellate Body.
It has also been suggested that the objection of the United States
Government to the right of other governments to be represented by
private counsel at hearings stems from a desire to keep the issue as a
"bargaining chip," to be traded for concessions the U.S. Government
is seeking regarding, for example, what it sees as excessively strict
rules regarding the confidentiality of the proceedings. However, the
right of counsel seems so fundamental an aspect of WTO proceedings
as they are developing that it should not be held hostage to other
legitimate goals of U.S. trade policy.
2. Other adiudicatory fora. The Statute of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) expressly permits patties to engage counsel to
represent them. According to the Court's Registrar, Article 42 of the
Statute makes clear that:
"There are no limitations on the choice of counsel..
Any person
retained by a State to appear on its behalf in proceedings to which it is
a party may do so without further formality and without regard to
nationality or qualifications."

(Letter dated 7 March 1997 from Eduardo Valencia-Ospina,
Registrar, to C. Christopher Parlin).
Thus, the countries party to the ICJ Statute chose to follow the
customary international law standard and imposed no restrictions on
the role of outside counsel in disputes before the ICJ.
In two other well-known international dispute resolution
tribunals, the parties explicitly permitted disputing parties to be
represented by outside counsel. Rule 18 of the Arbitration Rules and
Rule 18 of the Conciliation Rules of the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSD) expressly permits parties
to be represented by counsel of their choice. Article 4 of the Rules of
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, which replicates Article 4 of
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the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, also provides that parties may be
represented or assisted by persons of their choice.
For proceedings before the European Court of Human Rig-hts. the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. the Permanent Court of
Arbitration and the United Nations Compensation Commission
(adjudicating claims against Iraq), there are no limitations on who
may represent a Government party.
3. Other International
Organizations.
The practice of
international organizations, although not directly relevant to analysis
of the WTO's limitation of the role of outside counsel in panel
proceedings, confirms the almost universal adherence to the
customary international law principle that sovereign states are free
to choose who represents them. Definition No. 1005 in the Annex to
the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
explicitly provides that "Each 10 Member shall be free to make up its
delegation as it wishes." No organ of the United Nations imposes any
restriction on the composition of delegations, which may be comprised
of technical experts, including lawyers, drawn from the private sector.
The same is true with respect to the International Labour Office
(ILO), the Organization of American States (OAS), the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), in all of which the
member states are free to accredit whomever they wish as members
of their delegations to meetings and conferences. Under the Multi
Fibers Agreement, by which a Textile Surveillance Body was created,
now succeeded by the Textile Monitoring Body under the WTO
umbrella, in at least two cases private U.S. counsel for small
countries (but not made a part of the countries' delegations) were
asked to withdraw from oral arguments at the request of the U.S.
government representatives. They did so. However, no rules have
been adopted by the new Body that either sanction or prevent a
repetition of such an event.
IV. Issues of Concern
A number of proper concerns have been identified. However,
each can be addressed without a blanket exclusion of all private
counsel from the WTO dispute settlement process:
A. Confidentiality
This issue relates to two types of information: (i) confidential
(including diplomatic) information developed in the panel proceeding
itself, and (ii) confidential information (primarily business data)
which may have been generated in the underlying matter or dispute
which is the subject of the dispute settlement proceeding. For
purposes of this discussion, the term confidential information, when
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used in a general sense, includes all the information which may be
considered confidential, ranging from business confidential
commercial information developed in the underlying proceeding to
diplomatic information provided by member states during the
proceedings to the WTO panel. For a variety of legal as well as
practical reasons, the possibility of the unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information by private counsel should not preclude the
participation of such counsel in WTO dispute settlement proceedings
at all levels; it is merely a question of determining how to deal with
such an occurrence.
Private counsel have participated in a significant number of
dispute settlement proceedings conducted under the aegis of a variety
of other international organizations without apparent problems
relating to the disclosure of confidential information. Moreover,
private counsel have formally represented and informally advised
member states in a number of previous GATT and WTO proceedings
without apparent instances of unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information. Most of this representation involved preparation and
review of written submissions, rather than participation in oral
proceedings before the panels. However, the issue of disclosure of
confidential information exists with respect to the written submission
stages of a panel proceeding, whether or not counsel participates in
any oral hearings. The history of past proceedings involving private
counsel suggests that the unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information has not been a problem.
WTO panel reviews of government proceedings or activities
involving business confidential information ("BCI") submitted by
private parties has increased since the WTO was established and is
likely to continue to do so. Dispute settlement proceedings under the
DSU, such as the Kodak/Fuji Film proceeding initiated by the United
States against Japan, will likely involve information concerning the
activities of private companies of a business confidential nature.
Article 17 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (The "Antidumping Code")
and Article 4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (The "Subsidies Code") provide for DSU dispute settlement
proceedings involving the review of member state antidumping and
countervailing duty determinations. The underlying antidumping and
countervailing duty investigations necessarily involve BCI submitted
by parties to such investigations. Disclosure of such BCI to private
counsel unregulated by the submitting government agencies would be
a matter of concern to government agencies soliciting such
information as well as to the private parties submitting such
information in the underlying investigations.
However, in most cases, WTO dispute settlement proceedings
could be conducted without the need to disclose such BCI to private
counsel. The majority of disputes made subject to WTO panel review
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involve questions of "law" in which the fact analysis involves
otherwise public information. Where review of BCI is involved, public
summaries of such information can be provided in most cases without
disclosing confidential information in a manner harmful to the
private parties originally submitting such information. Furthermore,
a commitment to maintaining the confidentiality of any BCI, similar
but not necessarily identical to U.S. administrative protective orders,
could be adopted.
Sovereign governments may well be unwilling to submit BCI in
WTO dispute settlement proceedings whether or not private counsel
represent parties to such proceedings. Submitting governments may
view unauthorized disclosure by government officials of other parties
involved in such proceedings just as, if not more, likely than
disclosure by private counsel. In any case, the involvement of private
counsel does not generate a concern which would not otherwise arise
without their participation in such proceedings. It is also possible
that BCI submitted in WTO dispute settlement proceedings could be
reviewed only by the panel members and not the parties to the
proceeding. In such a case, the involvement of private counsel would
not create any issue related to the unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information.
Finally, procedures for allowing private counsel to play a role
should require all such lawyers to execute a statement binding him or
her to adhere to a Code of Conduct developed by the WTO through
the DSB Secretariat, which would prohibit unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information. (A draft of such a Code is attached.)
Sanctions for the violation of such commitment would include
removal from the pending dispute proceeding, disbarment from
future WTO proceedings, and referral of the violation to the
appropriate bar or other professional association for appropriate
sanctions. The prestige attached to the opportunity to participate in a
WTO dispute settlement proceeding would, for practical purposes,
serve as a strong incentive for private counsel to conduct themselves
in a manner which would insure their continued participation in the
on-going, as well as future proceedings.
B. Ethical Issues.
Another concern with the role of private counsel in WTO
proceedings involves an ethical problem perceived by some in the
possibility that private counsel in a particular matter might
previously have argued or may thereafter argue a different or even
opposite point of view. However, lawyers involved in international
trade matters - probably no less than in many other areas of the law
- may well and often do represent clients with different interests. On
one day a trade lawyer may represent a U.S. company seeking the
imposition of antidumping duties; on the following day that same
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lawyer may represent a foreign producer seeking to avoid such duties.
Corporate lawyers represent both acquiring and target companies;
patent lawyers represent both licensees and licensors; trial lawyers
are seated at the plaintiffs table in one case and appear for the
defense in the next. The U.S. Government, itself, in trade matters as
in many others, appears on both sides in disputes and urges a strict
reading of the applicable rules in one case and a broader
interpretation in another.
An examination of the rules of professional conduct applicable to
lawyers in the United States (and in the District of Columbia in
particular) does not support the view that the a private counsel
appearing in one case cannot ethically argue a different view in a
separate proceeding so long as the interests of neither client is
adversely affected by such activity.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("ABA Rules") and
the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct ("D.C. Rules"), suggest that,
when no conflict of interest exists, a lawyer must be able to advocate
a legal position on behalf of one client (client 2) in one matter (matter
2), even if it is inconsistent with the position that same lawyer has
previously advocated before the same tribunal on behalf of a former
client (client 1) in a different matter (matter 1).
The appropriate threshold legal question is not whether a lawyer
may advocate an inconsistent interpretation of law, but under what
circumstances a lawyer may advocate an inconsistent interpretation
of law. The ABA and D.C. Rules devote great attention to conflicts of
interest. Rule 1.7 prohibits representation of client 2 if such
representation will be directly adverse to or materially limited by the
lawyer's representation of an existing client, client 1. See ABA Rule
1.7; D.C. Rule 1.7(b). Rule 1.9 prohibits representation of client 2 in
the same matter or a substantially related matter if the
representation is materially adverse to the interests of a former
client, client 1. ABA Rule 1.9(a); D.C. Rule 1.9; see also, Brown v.
D.C. Bd. Of Zoning Adjustment, 486 A.2d 37 (D.C. 1984) (en banc)
(leading case defining "substantially related" matters in context of
former government employment). There is nothing about the mere
argument of different positions in different cases, perhaps because no
problem is seen in such activity.
Provisions of the ABA and D.C. rules provide support for the
proposition that a lawyer can, and indeed must, where warranted,
advocate interpretations of the law that may not be entirely
consistent.5 Principally, a lawyer is bound to diligently represent his
client's interests. ABA Rule 1.3; D.C. Rule 1.3(a). Diligently

5.
Obviously, lawyers are prohibited from advancing arguments that are
frivolous. ABA Rule 3.1; D.C. Rule 5 3.1. But arguing inconsistent legal interpretations
does not necessarily mean that either argument is frivolous.
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representing a client does not necessarily preclude arguing opposing
positions of law. Indeed, to represent a client diligently a lawyer may
need to advocate an inconsistent legal position from that taken in a
prior matter on behalf of a prior client.
Similarly, the comments to ABA Rule 1.9 explain that a lawyer
must decline subsequent representations involving positions adverse
to a former client arising in "substantially related matters." ABA
Lawyers' Manual on Prof. Conduct (BNA) 01 : 123-6 (1996). "The
underlying question [regarding whether a conflict of interest exists] is
whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the
subsequent representation can be justly regarded as changing sides
in the matter in question." - Id. at 01 : 124. Indeed, D.C. Bar Advisory
Opinion No. 265 states explicitly that a "traditional notion in the law
of legal ethics holds that there is nothing unseemly about a lawyer's
taking directly opposing views in different cases so long as the lawyer
does not do so simultaneously." Op. No. 265, supra at 101.
C. Cost to Participants.
The Panel in the Bananas case suggested that allowing private
counsel to represent countries might impose undue financial burdens
on smaller countries. However, as the Appellate Body noted in
Bananas it is precisely the developing country Members that most
need such aid. We think they may be able to obtain it on reduced fee
or pro bono bases or by ftmding from interested third parties. If so,
others should not object. The source of counsel's remuneration is not
generally a subject of inquiry in courts or agencies. We do not suggest
that the WTO establish a "legal aid" system, although the DSU, itself,
contemplates the provision of legal assistance to those in need.
However, this is a fairly modest undertaking and cannot be compared
to the right of a country to seek private counsel on a paid or unpaid
basis.
It is particularly inappropriate for countries with in-house legal
resources, such as the U.S. or E.U., to object to efforts of others to
retain outside legal advisors for assistance at hearings. The U.S. has
a particularly rich history of permitting persons to be represented by
counsel in all manner of proceedings and includes the right to counsel
(in criminal cases, to be sure) in its Constitutional Bill of Rights. It is
our tradition to encourage the use of counsel to help find the facts,
and present them in an orderly manner to allow decision-makers to
make more informed judgments. All of these considerations favor a
change in present practice.
D. Behavior of Private Counsel
The Bananas case Panel also questioned its (and the WTO's)
ability to maintain the "character of the proceeding" as intended to
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settle disputes. However, counsel who fail to behave appropriately
may be disqualified or barred by the WTO and disciplined by their
country of admission to the bar. The WTO can adopt a simple Code of
Conduct for lawyers that, essentially, binds them to the local ethical
codes of the professional associations to which such counsel are
admitted and contemplates a report to that association of breaches
(as occurs when a lawyer appears in different country -- or even U.S.
state -- from that in which he/she is admitted). Acknowledgment
forms, covering also 14 confidentiality obligations, can readily be
required of all counsel appearing.
More to the point, dispute settlement is as important a priority
for modern lawyers as advocacy in disputes. Many private lawyers
are now trained and expert in mediation and arbitration. The many
lawyers who successfully help clients in transnational commercial
transactions also use such skills. If properly instructed by their
clients and the forum, there is no reason to presume U.S. -- or any
other -- lawyers cannot or would not seek settlements as readily as
government representatives if so requested by the parties that
retained them.
E. Domestic Pressure
The unique provisions regarding private counsel appearing at
panel hearings in the context of NAFTA Art. 20, dispute settlements
may have been adopted because the NAFTA signatories were anxious
to avoid pressure from private interests in their own countries from
demanding a right (or even opportunity) to be heard or otherwise
participate in dispute resolution proceedings affecting those interests.
A uniform, "neutral principle" barring all private counsel was thought
to assist the governments in resisting such demands. However, such a
problem seems an inappropriate basis to deny the right of other
parties to retain counsel of their choosing to assist them. If
governments wish to bar private counsel from their own delegations,
they may, of course, do so.
VI. The ABA's Position
The DSU was an important step in furthering the "rule of law"
and is a key element in the Uruguay Round Agreements that the
ABA has supported in the past.. The agreements creating the WTO
are crucial to a regime of fair and free trade and are best
implemented through an effective dispute settlement regime.
The Uruguay Round Agreements introduced sufficient novelties
to the prior GATT dispute resolution system and greatly enlarged its
substantive scope, so that the issue of counsel should be reconsidered
and conformed to generally accepted practices in other "rule based"
systems. It is a point at least equal in importance to the issues of
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transparency that the USTR is vigorously pursuing. Viewed from the
perspective of a Member, it is hard to justify an institutional rule or,
even more questionable, and ad hoc approach, denying a party the
right to select whomever it wishes to assist it in its participation in
WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
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Attachment 1
Code of Conduct
1.

Members may be represented in proceedings before WTO
Dispute Settlement Bodies by "Private Counsel" who subscribe
to this Code of Conduct.

2.

"Private Counsel" shall mean an individual who is, and
represents and warrants that as of this date he/she is:
a.
A member in good standing of a bar or other
professional organization in a Member state, which
organization conditions admission and continued good
standing on (I) sufficient education, (ii) a review of
qualifications by a government operated or sanctioned
agency, and (iii) adherence to ethical obligations generally
recognized as appropriate throughout the world; and
b.
Retained by a Member for the purposes of rendering
professional advice in a proceeding governed by the Dispute
Settlement Understanding;

3.

Private Counsel expressly represents that he/she:
a.
Is familiar with the organization, history and
operation of the World Trade Organization to the extent
they may be applicable to the proceeding for which he/she
has been retained, and is professionally qualified to provide
advice regarding such proceeding;
b.
Understands, and will conduct himself/herself in
accordance with such understanding, that only Members
are the parties before the WTO Dispute Settlement Bodies
and him/her representation in all respects will be consistent
with the representation of a Member in a proceeding in
which all other parties are also and exclusively Members or
representatives of the WTO;
c.
Will accept instruction for him/her professional
services solely from or with the informed consent of the
Member by which he/she was retained; and
d.
Provides below him/her signature, reflecting
agreement with, and consent to, this Code and the name
and address of the: disciplinary body of the bar or other
professional organization on which the representation in
2.a. above is based and to which any violation of this Code
of Conduct may be reported by the WTO Secretariat.

